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The key to the problem of estimating  long-run [import]  elasticity lies, I feel 
sure, in the supply  side of the supply-demand  picture. 
Even to approximate  it will probably  require  a close survey of the American 
economy,  with a view to ascertaining  the extent  of each industry's  vulnerability 
to price competition  from abroad or, conversely, its ability to raid the for- 
eigner's  share of our domestic market.-Arnold  C. Harberger' 
THE INADEQUACIES  of  the  time  series  models  of  import  and  export 
behavior have long been apparent. To justify the omission of the supply 
side, the typical Keynesian function has been based upon the assumptions 
of imperfect substitution and infinite supply elasticities of  importables 
both at home and abroad. While a cyclical variable is sometimes intro- 
duced to capture nonprice rationing effects such as changes in delivery 
times (as well as the particular cyclical composition of demand), the most 
common specification makes the demand for imports (exports)  a function 
of their relative price and an activity variable. 
Although  such equations have been able to fit historical data with a 
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1. Arnold C. Harberger,  "A Structural  Approach to the Problem of Import De- 
mand," American Economic Review, vol. 43  (May 1953, Papers and Proceedings, 
1952), pp. 157-58. 
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reasonable  degree  of accuracy,  their coefficients  have not been particu- 
larly stable.2  Yet for the United States,  the qualitative implications  of a 
pair of such equations  have proved to be essentially  correct  for almost 
thirty  years. In a seminal  paper,  Houthakker  and Magee fitted conven- 
tional  import  and export  functions  to annual  data  from the 1951-66 pe- 
riod  and  estimated  an income  elasticity  for U.S. imports  of 1.5, which  was 
considerably  greater  than  the estimated  elasticity  of 1.0 on foreign  income 
in the U.S. export  equation.3  These estimates  of import  demand  elastici- 
ties imply  ceteris  paribus  that equal rates of growth  in the United States 
and in the rest of the world will mean a declining  U.S. trade balance. 
Assuming  trade  is initially  balanced,  U.S. growth  would have to be one- 
third  less than growth  abroad  to maintain  balance.4  This "Houthakker- 
Magee  effect"  stems  mainly  from  trade  in manufactured  goods. A pair of 
equations  for manufactured  goods indicates  foreign and U.S. long-run 
income  elasticities  for U.S. exports  and  imports  of manufactured  goods  are 
1.3 and  3.1, respectively.5  Given  the annual  growth  rates  in the  U.S. poten- 
tial  GNP  of 3.7 percent  (for the 1960-77 period) and  in the potential  out- 
put  for the "rest  of the world"  of 6.0 percent,  the coefficients  imply  annual 
growth  rates of 11.5 percent  for U.S. manufactured  goods imports  but 
only  7.8 percent  for U.S. manufactured  goods  exports. 
As the quotation  from  Harberger  above  indicates,  economists  have  long 
been concerned  about  the purely  demand-side  orientation  of these trade 
equations.  Domestically  produced commodities  are likely to be close 
substitutes  for imports  of many producer  goods, such as chemicals  and 
metals,  and consumer  goods, such as clothing  and shoes. In these cases 
the coefficient  on the income  term  in an import  function  will actually  be 
an excess demand  elasticity  derived  from the home demand  and supply 
2. For a discussion  of the stability of U.S. import and export functions see Peter 
Hooper, "The Stability of Income and Price Elasticities in U.S. Trade, 1957-1977," 
International  Finance Discussion Paper 119 (Board of  Governors of  the Federal 
Reserve System, June 1978). See also Robert M. Stern, Christopher  F. Baum, and 
Mark  N. Greene, "Evidence  on Structural  Change in the Demand for Aggregate U.S. 
Imports and Exports,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87 (February 1979), pp. 
179-92. 
3. H. S. Houthakker and Stephen P. Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities in 
World  Trade,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 51 (May 1969), pp. 111-25. 
4.  If growth exceeded this rate, the terms of trade would have to decline to main- 
tain balance. 
5. See Robert Z. Lawrence,  "An Analysis of the 1977 U.S. Trade Deficit,"  BPEA, 
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functions.6  The coefficient  on income  in the conventional  import  function 
for such undifferentiated  products  is better expressed  as a reduced-form 
parameter  that picks up the combined  effects of domestic supply and 
demand  rather  than  as an  income  elasticity  of demand  in the sense  that  it is 
used in consumer  theory.7  And in such cases the relative  price term is 
likely  to be an estimate  of the price  elasticity  between  importables  and all 
other home goods. For standardized  products,  relative cost  schedules, 
rather  than relative  prices,  will determine  trade  performance.  If the for- 
eign supply  schedule  for importables  shifts  downward  over time, foreign- 
ers will increase  their shares  of the domestic  market  at any given price. 
The conventional  import  specification,  which  fails to include  costs in the 
equation,  will pick up this effect  in the income  coefficient. 
In the case in which imports  are imperfect  substitutes,  there are also 
sound  reasons  to suspect  that  the coefficient  on the income  variable  is not 
a pure  income-demand  elasticity.  In theory,  given preferences  and infor- 
mation,  only  income  and  relative  prices  affect  demand.  But  when  a foreign 
producer  penetrates  a new market,  he is likely to invest substantial  re- 
sources  in familiarizing  the market  with his product.  It will take time to 
establish  a service capability,  acquire  a reputation,  and pry consumers 
loose from their  old familiar  habits.  These effects  will not be reflected  in 
price,  but they should  shift the demand  curve.  It is reasonable  to suspect 
that the penetration  pattern  will take the form of the familiar  logistic or 
S-shaped  curve that characterizes  most adoption  processes. The likely 
phases  are a struggle  to obtain  a foothold, a period  of rapid  growth,  and 
a tapering  off toward a long-run  trend share.8  During this penetration 
6.  If M(Y) = D(Y) -  S(Y), where M is the quantity of imports demanded, D is 
the home demand for  importables, and S  is the home  supply, this implies that 
emy  = (D/M)edy -  (S/M)e,y, where emy  is the import income elasticity; edy, the in- 
come elasticity  of demand;  and e,y, the income elasticity  of supply. 
7.  For a discussion of this distinction and for the derivation of the equation for 
the import-income elasticity see Stephen P. Magee, "Prices, Incomes, and Foreign 
Trade,"  in  Peter  B.  Kenen,  ed.,  International  Trade  and  Finance:  Frontiers  for  Re- 
search (Cambridge  University  Press, 1975), pp. 188-92. 
8. The entry of foreign automobiles into the United States is a prime example. 
Non-Canadian  imports had a minuscule share of the U.S. automobile market in the 
1950s. The penetration by Volkswagen made a small impression, and by 1964 the 
share of foreign automobiles in U.S. purchases was 6.5 percent. In the late 1960s 
there was a period of rapid  penetration,  however, and by 1970 the foreign share had 
shot up to 16 percent.  Yet in 1975, it was only 16.4 percent and in 1977, 17.2 percent. 
See United States International Trade Commission, Automotive Trade Statistics, 
1964-77, series B: Passenger  Automobiles, Publication 913 (USITC, 1978). 194  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
process,  foreign  producers  may  be constrained  by capacity  and  may  prefer 
to ration  in order  to build goodwill  rather  than charge  what the market 
will bear.  Once these producers  gain a foothold in the market,  they may 
well raise prices.  During  a period of rapid  penetration,  the econometric 
estimates  of the price  elasticity  of demand  are  unlikely  to detect  these de- 
velopments  and will therefore  not indicate  true  long-run  coefficients.  If a 
strong  trend  in import  penetration  occurs,  the coefficient  on the income 
term,  which  itself  has an  upward  trend,  is likely  to be biased  upward. 
The conventional  trade  equations  would also mislead  in the case when 
the entry  of foreign  producers  into the domestic  market  drives  the prices 
of domestic  substitutes  below the domestic  firms'  long-run  average  costs. 
Short-run  domestic  prices might decline,  but as firms  were driven  from 
the market  their shares would be taken over by new foreign entrants. 
Again  the  income  coefficient  might  pick  up this  effect. 
The neglect  of the supply  side could  well lead to erroneous  inferences. 
As the experiences  of Japan  and Germany  illustrate  (and the pure  theory 
of international  trade  reminds  us), growth  that  is biased  toward  an expan- 
sion of exportables  at given  terms  of trade  could  well lead to a trade  sur- 
plus rather  than a deficit. Only by making  the sectoral  composition  of 
growth  endogenous  will it be possible  to separate  supply  from  demand. 
The foregoing  suggests  that trade  equations  should  be specified  to ac- 
count explicitly  for the supply  side. An ideal model would  use the deter- 
minants  of costs in explaining  trade  behavior.  By taking  account  of long- 
run costs, it would be possible to distinguish  the price declines that 
represent  improvements  in productivity  and outward shifts in supply 
schedules  from those that represent  reduced  profitability  resulting  from 
inward  shifts  in demand. 
As a preliminary  step toward  undertaking  such a model, the appro- 
priate  level of disaggregation  must  be determined.  Common  practice  has 
explained  the movement  in manufactured  goods prices in international 
trade by using data for unit costs in the manufacturing  sector. In this 
paper, I present  evidence  that brings  this practice  into question.  Infer- 
ences about relative trade performance  and profitability  based upon 
manufacturing  sector  data are likely to be misleading.  In certain  foreign 
countries,  costs in export  industries  have risen considerably  less rapidly 
than costs in their manufacturing  sectors in general.  As a result of this 
"dualism,"  overall manufacturing  costs provide a misleading  indicator 
of true  export costs. In other countries,  most notably  the United States, Robert  Z. Lawrence  195 
there is little evidence of a similar  dualism;  costs in export industries 
seem to have run roughly  parallel  to those in manufacturing  as a whole. 
From  this  investigation,  I am  able  to draw  an important  conclusion.  If past 
trends  continue,  costs in U.S. manufacturing  must rise less rapidly  than 
those in manufacturing  abroad  for U.S. products  to remain  competitive  in 
world  markets. 
The Cost-Price  Puzzle 
Table 1 provides  time series on indexes of unit labor costs in manu- 
facturing  in the major  industrial  countries,  expressed  in U.S. dollars.  The 
data  are  surprising,  particularly  because  the  United  States  has  fared  poorly 
in manufactured  goods  trade,  while  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy  have done 
well. During  the 1960-77 period,  unit labor costs in U.S. manufacturing 
rose at an average  annual  rate of 3.3 percent,  while those in Japan,  Ger- 
many,  and  Italy rose at rates  of 8.4, 8.2, and 6.8 percent,  respectively.  In 
recent periods, this disparity  is even greater.  From 1970 to 1977, unit 
labor  costs rose 5.3 percent  annually  in the United  States  and 16.4, 12.8, 
and 10.1 percent  in Japan,  Germany,  and Italy,  respectively. 
These disparities  in relative  unit costs could simply  indicate  that the 
absolute  costs (and prices) abroad  were initially  much  lower than those 
in the United  States.  But if this explanation  were  valid, one would expect 
to see relative  export  prices changing  in a similar  fashion.  Table 2 indi- 
cates  that  they  have  not. 
U.S. export  prices  closely  paralleled  both standard  unit  labor  costs and 
total unit costs until the price  hike of the Organization  of Petroleum  Ex- 
porting  Countries  in 1973 raised the relative  price of materials  inputs, 
and thus the margin  between  prices and value added  in manufacturing. 
By contrast,  the ratio of export  prices  to either  standard  unit labor costs 
or total unit costs fell persistently  through  1973 in Germany,  Italy, and 
Japan.  For these countries,  smaller  but substantial  downward  trends  are 
also evident  in the ratios  of export  prices  to value  added  in manufacturing 
and in the ratios  of export  prices  to wholesale  prices for finished  manu- 
factured  goods. 
To explore  the disparity  between  export  prices  of manufactured  goods 
and costs in manufacturing,  I estimated  a number  of export  price equa- 
tions that relate export prices to variables  commonly  used to explain ia  t  W  ? X  > n  o  o  m  o  t 
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them. The conventional  structural  interpretation  given to the equation 
for export  prices, P, is that of a markup  model. Firms are assumed  to 
set export  prices  by "marking  up" their unit labor costs (corrected  for 
cyclical  productivity),  SULC,  and  unit  materials  costs, UMC;  that  is, 
P  =  k(SULC)  +  k(UMC). 
The markup,  k, is in turn assumed  to depend  upon competitors'  prices, 
PC, and capacity  utilization  at home, Gd,  and abroad,  Ga.9  This leads to 
an estimation  equation  in logarithmic  form: 
log P  =  ao +  a, log SULC +  a2  log  UMC  +  a3 log PC 
+  a4  log Gd  +  a5  log Ga. 
Estimating  this equation  alone implies  that SULC, UMC,  and PC are 
exogenous.  In fact, theory  suggests  that  these  variables  are  more  properly 
considered  as endogenous  to a more  fully specified  equation  system. 
An alternative  formulation  takes domestic  prices, DP,  as exogenous 
and assumes  that export  prices  are more strongly  influenced  by competi- 
tors'  prices  and  have  different  cyclical  movements: 
log P  =  bo  +  bi log DP +  b2  log PC +  b3 log Ga +  b4 log Gd. 
In table 3 several  equations  for export price, based on formulations 
such  as these,  are  reported  for each  major  industrial  country.  The aim  here 
is not to select  the best equation,  but  rather  to look for unexplained  trends 
in export  prices. Some of the equations  have estimated  coefficients  that 
render  them of dubious  merit.  In particular,  the coefficients  on the nom- 
inal variables sum to more than unity. But together they convey the 
strong  impression  that in Germany,  Italy, Japan,  and, to a lesser degree, 
France,  unit values  for exports  have shown significant  downward  move- 
ments  relative  to the explanatory  variables.10  Adding a time trend  to the 
equations  for these countries  leads to a significant  negative  coefficient  on 
9.  For a more complete presentation,  see Peter B. Clark, "The Effects of Recent 
Exchange Rate Changes on the U.S. Trade Balance," in Peter B. Clark, Dennis E. 
Logue, and Richard James Sweeney, eds., The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjust- 
ments, proceedings of a conference sponsored by OASIA Research, Department of 
the Treasury (Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 201-36. 
10. In the case of Japan,  the use of the export price index as a dependent  variable 
gave results similar to those of the unit value index for manufactured  goods. Robert  Z. Lawrence  199 
the trend  term and an improvement  in the estimated  coefficients  of the 
equations.  On the other  hand,  for the United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and the 
United  States,  the trend  term is generally  insignificant. 
The equations  do reveal  some further  interesting  features  of pricing  in 
export  markets.  The state of the cycle in the rest of the world does not 
influence  export  pricing,  and  only  in the case of Japan  is the cycle at home 
a significant  factor. (As a result,  only for Japan  do the equations  use the 
ratio  of actual  to potential  manufacturing  output  as an independent  vari- 
able.) Competitors'  prices,  ROWPX, play a major  role in determination 
of  export prices, although the noticeable reduction in  some of  the 
ROWPX  coefficients  when wholesale and materials  prices are used as 
explanatory  variables  suggests  that part of the competitive  effect could 
actually  stem  from  a common  rise  in the prices  of global  raw  materials. 
Without  the dummy  variable  for the price control period, the U.S. 
equations  exhibit large residuals  in 1972 and 1973. Because controls 
apparently  held down  export  prices,  the influence  of devaluation  on U.S. 
export  prices  during  this period  is underestimated.-'  This strong  effect  on 
export prices from controls is further  evidence that U.S. export prices 
closely  reflect  the  behavior  of U.S. domestic  prices. 
EXPLAINING  THE  TRENDS 
Several  explanations  might be offered  for the strong  negative  trends 
in export prices relative  to other prices in Japan, Germany,  Italy, and 
France. One explanation  might be measurement  error.  The weaknesses 
of unit  values  as a price  measure  are  well known.  Yet the series  on export 
prices, which indicate  strong  competitive  improvements  for these coun- 
tries (or smaller competitive  declines), are more consistent  with their 
actual  trade  performance  than  are  the cost data,  which  suggest  large  com- 
petitive losses. The weakness  could lie in the data on unit labor costs. 
Although  the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  strives  to ensure  that these 
data are comparable  across countries,  it cautions: "published  average 
11. In the state-o.f-the-art  paper on the effects of the exchange rate changes in 
1971-73 on the U.S. trade balance, Clark obtains a statistically significant negative 
effect of  dollar devaluation on U.S. dollar export prices, yet he dismisses it as a 
statistical fluke.  See his "The Effects  of Recent Exchange  Rate Changes,"  p. 213, note 
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hourly  earnings  may  not include  the same  items  of labor  compensation  in 
each  country."112  But because  the trends  persist  with alternative  equations 
when other prices replace  costs, it is difficult  to dismiss  them simply  as 
statistical  aberrations.13 
If the data are accepted,  several  alternative  hypotheses  can be consid- 
ered. The first  is that firms  manufacturing  for export in these countries 
have been prepared  to cut their  profit  margins  continuously.  This expla- 
nation  i6 credible  as a short-run  response  to competitive  pressures,  but it 
cannot explain trends  over a seventeen-year  period. The coefficients  in 
the Japanese,  Italian,  and German  equations  indicate  that export  prices 
fell relative  to costs by between  1 and 3 peroent  a year. Profits  as a pro- 
portion  of value added  would have had to be implausibly  large initially 
to permit  such  declines.  In addition,  the equations  suggest  that  this reduc- 
tion in export  prices occurred  in excess of that required  by competitive 
pressures.  There  is evidence  that  German  and  Japanese  export  firms  have 
had to reduce their profit  margins  in recent years. But it is difficult  to 
believe that the export sector in these economies  expanded  throughout 
the 1960s in the face of persistent,  large  declines  in profit  margins.14 
Government  export  subsidies  are another  potential  explanation  that is 
implausible  in view of the persistence  of these price trends.  In Germany, 
for example,  from 1961 to 1973 the export  price  index  for manufactured 
goods declined  15 percent  relative  to the wholesale  price  index  for manu- 
factured  goods. A subsidy  of 15 percent  to manufactured  goods exports 
would amount  to 2.6 percent  of the German  GNP or 14.5 percent  of gov- 
ernment  expenditures  in 1973. 
A more reasonable  explanation  is that the cost data are poor reflec- 
tions of the costs of manufacturing the particular commodities that are 
exported.  According  to this hypothesis,  actual  unit costs for export  goods 
12. "Estimated  Hourly Compensation  of Production  Workers  in Manufacturing: 
Twelve Countries, 1975-1977  and Eight Countries, 1978" (Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics, Office  of Productivity  and Technology, October 1978). 
13. For a complete discussion of the relative strengths  and weakness of available 
competitive  indicators,  see Irving B. Kravis and Robert E. Lipsey, Price Competitive- 
ness in  World Trade, Studies in  International Economic Relations, 6  (National 
Bureau  of Economic Research, 1971), pp. 3-194. 
14. The estimates of expansion in domestic export supply relative to income ob- 
tained by Goldstein and Khan are 5.6 for Germany, 3.25 for Italy, and 2.6  for 
Japan.  See Morris Goldstein and Mohsin S. Khan, "The Supply and Demand for Ex- 
ports: A Simultaneous  Approach,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 60 (May 
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have risen less rapidly  than those in other industries,  and export firms 
have therefore  been able to lower their  relative  prices  while at the same 
time expand profitably.  Either productivity  growth  in the "export  sec- 
tors"  of these  economies  has been considerably  more  rapid  than produc- 
tivity  growth  in the rest of manufacturing,  or the export  industries  have 
made relatively  intensive  use of a factor of production  that has experi- 
enced  a decline  in relative  price.'5 
A Disaggregated  Analysis 
In principle  it should  be possible  to show by a disaggregated  analysis 
whether  costs  of export  products  have  risen  less rapidly  than  those  of other 
manufactured  products. In practice, however, if  export products are 
widely dispersed  across  firms and industries  or if they are qualitatively 
different  from products  sold domestically,  it will be difficult  to obtain 
sufficiently  disaggregated  data  to serve  as a useful  proxy  for export  costs. 
Where  export products  are concentrated  in a few industries  and where 
those product  costs are similar  to those sold domestically  from the same 
industry,  disaggregation  by industry  can be used to estimate  export  costs. 
In this section  I report  the results  of disaggregation  carried  out under  the 
assumption  that export  products  and domestic  products  from the same 
15. International  economists have often stressed  the "dualistic  nature"  of modern 
economies, although in doing so they have usually emphasized the distinction be- 
tween traded and nontraded goods. Balassa developed this distinction in his reap- 
praisal  of the theory of purchasing  power parity. See Bela Balassa, "The Purchasing- 
Power Parity Doctrine: A  Reappraisal,"  Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  72 
(December 1964), pp. 584-96.  The Scandinavian  theory of inflation relies upon a 
similar dualism in its account of the international  transmission  of inflation. See, for 
example, Odd Aukrust, "Inflation  in the Open Economy: A Norwegian Model," in 
Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds., Worldwide  Inflation: Theory and 
Recent Experience (Brookings Institution, 1977),  pp. 107-66.  Haberler explained 
the marked  disparity  between the Japanese  consumer  price and wholesale and export 
prices in terms of the different  productivity  growth rates between goods and service 
sectors. See Gottfried Haberler, "International  Aspects of U.S. Inflation,"  in Phillip 
Cagan and others, A New Look at Inflation: Economic Policy in the Early 1970s 
(American Enterprise Institute, 1973), pp. 91-92.  See also Ronald I. McKinnon, 
Monetary Theory and Controlled Flexibility in the Foreign Exchanges, Essays in 
International Finance, 84  (Princeton University Press, International Finance Sec- 
tion, 1971),  pp. 21-27.  However, in modeling trade behavior, international econ- 
omists have typically assumed that data for the manufacturing  sector were appro- 
priate  indicators  of costs in industries  competing  in exports  and imports. Robert  Z. Lawrence  205 
industry  have similar  costs, but that costs differ  across  industries.  Under 
this assumption,  the appropriate  aggregate  cost index for manufactured 
exports  is obtained  by a simple  reweighting  of industry  costs.'6 
JAPAN 
Table  4 presents  the result  of reweighting  cost data  for individual  Jap- 
anese  industries  by their  export  shares.  For each  industry,  unit  labor  cost, 
unit value added, and total unit value indexes were derived  by dividing 
the series on labor compensation,  net value added, and gross value of 
output  by the  industrial  production  index.  These  series  were  then  weighted 
by the 1970 share  of each industry  in Japanese  exports,  and the ratio of 
each to the corresponding  series for total Japanese  manufacturing  was 
computed.  The results  indicate  that  the costs  in Japanese  industries  with a 
large  export  share  increased  much  more slowly than those in total Japa- 
nese  manufacturing,  reflecting  the dualism  that  I hypothesize  as the expla- 
nation  for the  results  of tables  1 and  2.17 
The first three columns  of table 4 indicate  that during  the 1963-76 
period, when weighted by export shares, unit labor costs, unit value 
added, and total unit values all declined  relative to the corresponding 
measures  for total manufacturing  by roughly  20 percent.  Moreover,  as 
column  4 indicates,  in contrast  to the strong  downward  movement  in the 
ratio of export prices to costs in manufacturing  obtained in table 2, 
manufacturing  unit values weighted  by industry  export shares  are con- 
sistent  with export  unit values  for the 1963-71 period.  Increasing  export 
subsidies,  declining  profit  margins  in export  sales, or measurement  errors 
16. The  disaggregation used data available in  United  Nations,  Yearbook of 
Industrial  Statistics. This source provides time series data on industrial  production; 
value added in producers'  values; value of gross output;  and wages, salaries and sup- 
plements  for three-digit  International-Standard-Industrial-Classification  (ISIC) man- 
ufacturing in several countries. Not  all  the  series are available for  each major 
industrial country, and for some countries certain series had to be aggregated or 
reweighted.  These data were matched with export data classified by the Standard- 
International-Trade-Classification  (SITC). Most industries in the three-digit ISIC 
classification  do correspond in a rough way to two- or three-digit categories in the 
SITC data, but the matching  is not perfect. 
17. The dualism referred  to here is somewhat different  from that which has been 
widely recognized in Japan. The latter refers to the coexistence of a "large-firm  see- 
tor" that has high wages and enjoys access to  cheap capital, and a  "small-firm 
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Table 4. Ratio of Export-Weighted  to Unweighted  Unit Labor  Costs, Unit Value  Added, 
and Total Unit Values,  and  of Export  Prices to Export-Weighted  Total Unit Values 
for Japanese  Manufacturing,  1963-76a 
Index, 1970  100 
Ratio of export-weighted  to unweighlted  index  Ratio of export 
price to export- 
Unit  Uniit  Total  weighted  total 
labor  costs  value  added  unit values  unit-value  index 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1963  112  111  108  98 
1964  107  108  105  98 
1965  105  104  104  97 
1966  102  103  100  96 
1967  102  104  100  98 
1968  100  98  102  98 
1969  101  99  100  100 
1970  100  100  100  100 
1971  98  93  99  102 
1972  98  96  98  95 
1973  95  102  97  93 
1974  92  98  92  104 
1975  92  84  90  96 
1976  86  90  90  92 
Sources: The data for 1970 Japanese exports are taken from United Nations, Yearbook  of International 
Trade Statistics: 1971 Edition. Unit labor costs for total manufacturing were provided by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The deflator for  total manufacturing (value added) was supplied by Michael Deppler 
of  the International Monetary Fund. All  other data are from  U.N.,  Yearbook of  Industrial Statistics, 
vol.  1: General  Industrial  Statistics, various issues, tables 4, 9, and 13. 
a.  The components of the series on unit labor costs were derived by dividing "wages and  salaries of 
employees" for each industry by the corresponding industrial production index. Similarly, the series on 
unit value added and total  unit values were derived by dividing "value added"  and  "gross  output," 
respectively, for each industry by the corresponding industrial production indexes. The food  products, 
tobacco, petroleum refineries,  and coal products industries were excluded to make the series conform to 
the data on Japanese exports. Each component industry was then weighted by its share in Japanese exports 
in 1970. The series presented are the ratio of the export-weighted  series to the corresponding (unweighted) 
series for total Japanese manufacturing. The export price series is the ratio of  the unit value index for 
manufactured goods  exports to  export-weighted total unit values in manufacturing (the ratio of  gross 
value of output to industrial production). 
can  be eliminated  as explanations  for the downward  trend  in export  prices 
relative  to total  manufacturing.  Changes  in export  product  prices  reflected 
the changes  in the costs of the industries  in which  they  were produced. 
As might  be expected,  exchange  rate  modifications  and cyclical  devel- 
opments  in the 1970s have changed  export prices relative  to costs. The 
decline in the ratio of export prices to total unit values (column 4)  in 
1972 and 1973 followed the appreciation  of the yen under the Smith- 
sonian  agreement  in December  1971, while the depreciation  of the yen in Robert  Z. Lawrence  207 
1974 moved  the ratio in the opposite  direction.  In 1975 and 1976, Jap- 
anese  exporters  used  foreign  markets  to increase  their  capacity  utilization, 
and  again  prices  declined  relative  to total  costs. 
Reweighting  industry  costs by their  export  shares  assumes that export 
and industry-wide  cost movements  are similar.  To explore  the extent to 
which export  prices have displayed  any trend  relative  to their domestic 
counterparts  within  particular  industries,  the components  of the Japanese 
export  price index were matched  with the corresponding  components  of 
the Japanese  wholesale price index. The estimated  annual percentage 
trends  in the relative  export  prices over the 1962-77 period are as fol- 
lows.'8 
Industry  Export  price trend 
Chemicals  -1.3 
(-2.9) 
Electrical  machinery  -0.2 
(-1.4) 
General  machinery  and  -1.5 
precision  instruments  (-6.3) 
Metals  and  related  products  -0.5 
(-1.6) 
Textiles  -2.1 
(-8.8) 
Transport  equipment  2.8 
(10.6) 
Statistically  significant  downward  trends are evident in three relative 
prices; downward  trends  that were not significant,  in two; and a signifi- 
cant upward  trend, in one. At the industry  level, therefore,  there is evi- 
dence of a disparity  in the trend  behavior  of domestic  and  foreign  prices. 
In summary,  by appropriately  matching  the costs in a particular Jap- 
anese industry with  export  prices  for that industry, much  of the puzzle  in 
the movement  of Japanese  export  prices can be explained.  However,  to 
obtain  a precise  estimate  of the true  costs facing  export  firms,  it will prob- 
ably be necessary  to disaggregate  beyond the industry  level because, in 
18. Here, as elsewhere in this report, the t-statistics  are in parentheses.  The data 
used in estimating  the trends  are from various issues of the Bank of Japan,  Economic 
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certain  sectors,  downward  trends  remain  when  industry  export  prices  are 
matched  with industry  wholesale  prices. 
OTHER  COUNTRIES 
For Germany,  Italy,  and  France,  the remaining  countries  in which  neg- 
ative trends  were evident  in the ratios  of export  prices to manufacturing 
industry  costs, a reweighting  of industry  unit costs by export  shares  failed 
to confirm  the results  reported  for Japan  in table 4. Explaining  the cost- 
price  puzzle  in these  countries  will require  considerable  investment  in the 
generation  of a new  data  base. 
A time trend like that found in the aggregate  regressions  of table 2 
showed  up in disaggregated  regressions  explaining  export  prices of non- 
electrical  machinery,  which accounted  for 23 percent  of exports  of Ger- 
man manufactured  goods in 1976. For this trade  category,  actual  export 
price series based upon contract  prices are available  for both Germany 
and the United States. It is therefore  an ideal candidate  for examining 
whether  a significant  dualism  is evident  within a particular  German  in- 
dustry.  Without  a time trend  variable,  the residuals  exhibit  strong  serial 
correlation.  When  the time trend  is added,  the serial  correlation  is elim- 
inated,  the standard  error  of the equation  improves,  and the t-statistic  of 
all the estimated  coefficients  also improves.  For the United States, re- 
weighting  was carried  out based both on export  shares  and import-com- 
peting shares  in different  industries.  Relative  to all manufacturing,  costs 
and  prices  in the export  sector  declined  slightly  between 1954 and 1977, 
while they rose slightly  in the import-competing  sector.  But these trends 
were  only  on the order  of 0.1 percent  a year. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In summary,  this  exploration  of dualism  by calculating  and  reweighting 
industry  costs has met with mixed  results.  In Japan,  it is evident  that the 
industries  with large shares  in Japanese  exports  are also those that have 
relatively  slower  increases  in costs. For the United  States,  the reweighting 
exercise  indicated  small differences  when industry  costs are reweighted, 
a result  consistent  with aggregate  data;  while in the cases of France,  Ger- 
many,  and Italy, I was unable  to find evidence  of significant  differences, 
which  leaves the aggregate  results  unexplained.  Because  I was able to di- Robert  Z. Lawrence  209 
vide the manufacturing  sector  into only twelve "industries,"  a more pre- 
cise disaggregation  might  meet with more success.  However,  even at the 
level of the nonelectrical  machinery  industry  in Germany,  costs for export 
products  have apparently  declined  relative  to costs for output  in general. 
These findings  are important  for model builders.  In representing  the 
supply side, extreme caution should be used when treating costs in 
manufacturing  in general  as a proxy  for costs in the "export  sector."  Al- 
though  the use of some variable  with a strong  time trend could provide 
an equation  with a good statistical  fit, the coefficients  on such a variable 
would  be biased.  Before  the determinants  of relative  costs  in international 
trade  can be analyzed,  a considerable  degree  of disaggregation  is needed. 
U.S. Competitiveness 
Because foreign manufactured  exports compete with U.S. products 
both in the United States and in third-world  markets,  changes  in their 
prices  relative  to those of U.S. manufactured  goods are the major  deter- 
minant  of U.S. international  price competitiveness."9  And because  of the 
declining  price  of exports  relative  to total manufactures  in some countries 
-what  I call dualism-and the absence  of such a dualism  in the United 
States,  for U.S. products  to maintain  their  international  price  competitive- 
ness, the average  price of its manufactured  goods has had to rise less 
rapidly  than  the average  in other  countries. 
The following equation  summarizes  this historic  relationship  for the 
1962-78 period: 
PX  =  1.03 +  0.97  PWP, 
(2.6)  (8.4) 
R2 =  0.81; standard  error =  1.5; Durbin-Watson  =  2.0, 
where  PX is the percentage  change  in the ratio of U.S. to foreign  export 
unit  values  and  PWP  the corresponding  ratio  of U.S. to foreign  wholesale 
prices  of manufactured  goods.20  This equation  implies  that, if there  were 
19. U.S. exports will also compete with domestic manufactured goods in each 
foreign market. 
20. The denominiators  in these two ratios are a weighted average taken from 
thirteen industrial countries. For a detailed description,  see International  Monetary 
Fund, International  Financial Statistics,  vol. 32 (March 1979), p. 416. Data are from 
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no change  in relative  U.S. wholesale  prices, relative  U.S. export prices 
would have increased  at an annual rate of 1.03 percentage  points per 
year. For relative  U.S. export  prices  to have remained  constant,  the rela- 
tive prices of manufactured  goods would have had to decline by 1.06 
percentage  points  a year.  The relationships  summarized  by the regression 
remain  apparent  in recent  data.  In 1978, for example,  U.S. relative  export 
unit  values  were  roughly  at their 1975 levels  despite  a 6 percent  decline  in 
the  relative  price  of U.S. manufactures  between  the two years. 
Like  the Houthakker-Magee  effect  discussed  at the outset  of this  paper, 
the equation  relating  relative  export  prices and relative  wholesale  prices 
should  be interpreted  as a statistical  summary  of a historic  relationship. 
The historical  divergence  between  these two endogenous  variables  is an 
important  fact underlying  the declining  competitive  position  of the United 
States.  Just as the Houthakker-Magee  effect predicts  that equal growth 
rates  here  and  abroad  will lead  to a declining  U.S. trade  balance,  this  equa- 
tion predicts  that equal inflation  in manufactured  goods prices  here and 
abroad  will also  lead  to a declining  trade  balance. 
The dualism  between  prices  of exports  and all manufactured  goods in 
the rest  of the world  explains  why indicators  of prices  and costs in manu- 
facturing  have not provided  an accurate  picture  of U.S. price  competitive- 
ness. This report  has drawn  attention  to this disparity  between costs in 
export  and  other  industries  in certain  foreign  economies.  Further  research 
is needed to determine  the contribution  of factors such as economies  of 
scale,  technological  imitation,  embodied  technical  change,  and changes  in 
factor  endowments  as causes  of these  disparities,  and  to determine  whether 
these  disparities  will  persist. 
Discussion 
MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION  focused on what might explain exceptional 
productivity  gains  in export  industries.  Marina  Whitman  suggested  that, 
even  if subsidies  did  not directly  explain  the differential  price  performance 
of export  industries,  they could play a role indirectly  by allowing  export 
industries  to reach  their  technological  potential  and to achieve  sufficient 
economies  of scale. James  Duesenberry  described  two distinct  situations Robert  Z. Lawrence  211 
that  might  give  rise  to exceptional  productivity  growth  in some  industries. 
In the first,  countries  may have developed  industries  or products  that are 
growing  rapidly  in world  markets.  The interesting  question  in this case is 
what  characteristics  of a country  permit  it to gain  leadership  in those new 
industries.  In the second, a country  may have a latent comparative  ad- 
vantage  in an established  product  that  it utilizes  increasingly  over time  to 
expand  its production  and  world  market  share.  Both situations  involve  an 
interaction  of scale effects, demand growth, and technical  change, and 
may well include subsidies  and protection,  at least initially.  He doubted 
that one could understand  these developments  by estimating  models  with 
fixed coefficients  and technologies.  William Nordhaus added that the 
differential  productivity  growth  among  a country's  industries  would de- 
termine  its exports.  The differentials  could be inherent  in the country's 
basic human and physical resources.  The wider these differentials,  the 
more apparent  would  be the duality  that Lawrence  identified. 
Robin Marris  hypothesized  that similar  technological  dynamics  apply 
both to the successful  export  performance  of other countries  and to the 
failure  of U.S. exports  to expand.  This dynamism  produces  an S-shaped 
growth  curve;  although  technological  catch-up  is one element  of the steep 
portion of this curve, other qualitative  characteristics  of economies are 
involved that are difficult  to model. The United States  is past this steep 
portion,  while countries  exporting  to it are not. Some developing  coun- 
tries may now be in this phase, supplanting  European  economies  whose 
exports  expanded  so much  during  the past two decades. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  emphasized  the importance  for policy  formulation 
of sorting  out the reasons  behind  the erosion  in U.S. competitiveness.  The 
conventional  import demand  equation  implies we need to slow growth 
and control domestic  inflation  in order  to improve  the current  account. 
By contrast,  if the differences  in productivity  growth  are  due to economies 
of scale or to the opening  of new markets  for new products,  channeling 
resources  into expansion  and research  and development  might  be a su- 
perior  policy  to slowing  growth  or controlling  wages. 
Peter  Kenen  noted that  the dualism  hypothesis  was most  evident  in the 
data  for Japan  and  was more  difficult  to identify  for other  countries.  This 
led him to hypothesize  an explanation  rooted in the institutions  of the 
Japanese  economy. There, the home market  is so thoroughly  sheltered 
from competition  that it provides  a high margin  of profits  for Japanese 
producers;  this, in turn, provides an implicit subsidy for exports and 212  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
permits  Japanese  producers  to operate  with low or variable  profits  at the 
margin  in their  export  business.  The dualism  hypothesis  may thus apply 
mainly  to Japan  and may reflect  the peculiar  characteristics  of the Japa- 
nese home market  more than it does other differences  between  the U.S. 
economy  and  its trading  partners.  Lawrence  responded  that, although  he 
had been unable to provide  disaggregated  evidence  for other countries, 
the strength  and  significance  of the downward  trends  in their  export  prices 
relative  to their prices for all manufactures  could not be ignored.  Also 
the dualism  effect was apparent  in the equation  at the end of the paper, 
which used data from thirteen industrial  countries;  this showed that 
dualism  was  not a uniquely  Japanese  phenomenon. 